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We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
From:
Boris van Leeuwen
Abhijit Ramalingam
David Rojo Arjona
Arthur Schram
Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University
Department of Economics, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University,
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University
Department of Economics, EUI (Florence) and CREED, University of Amsterdam
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
From:
Boris van Leeuwen
Abhijit Ramalingam
David Rojo Arjona
Arthur Schram
Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University
Department of Economics, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University,
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University
Department of Economics, EUI (Florence) and CREED, University of Amsterdam