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Only Paul Could Go To Changchun

Reconsidering Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets

1/24/2020

 
Here.

The ability of markets to aggregate diverse information is a cornerstone of economics and finance, and empirical evidence for such aggregation has been demonstrated in previous laboratory experiments. Most notably Plott and Sunder (1988) find clear support for the rational expectations hypothesis in their Series B and C markets. However, recent studies have called into question the robustness of these findings. In this paper, we report the result of a direct replication of the key information aggregation results presented in Plott and Sunder. We do not find the same strong evidence in support of rational expectations that Plott and Sunder report suggesting information aggregation is a fragile property of markets.

  • Brice Corgnet(camera@chapman.edu) (Emlyon Business School)
  • Cary Deck(University of Alabama & Chapman University)
  • Mark DeSantis(Chapman University)
  • Kyle Hampton(Chapman University)
  • Erik O. Kimbrough(Chapman University)


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