Here.

This paper outlines a classroom trading game that explores equilibrium terms of trade using the principle of comparative advantage and theory of reciprocal demand. Students are divided into eight groups. Each group is assigned a country with hypothetical productivity and each country seeks its trading partner based on comparative advantage. Students simulate the trading of goods between countries with the objective of achieving the best possible terms of trade. The game encourages students to reflect on their learning of the principle of comparative advantage, consider improvements in trade terms through negotiation, and summarize the conditions for mutually beneficial terms of trade. The study contributes to the existing literature by extending the discussion beyond comparative advantage to incorporate mutually beneficial terms of trade as well as factors contributing to the distribution of trade gains.

​From:
Bei Hong

Here.

Smith firmly believed that, on the first three causes at least, it was better to have close personal relationships and trade based on personal knowledge and trust. But these do not operate well at scale. And scale is what division of labor wants, and needs. Division of labor is what causes opulence; as Smith put it, in the title of chapter 3 of book I of Wealth of Nations, “The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.” The fourth cause, the utility of the unfettered scope of commercial activity, ultimately suggests the necessity of rethinking systems of propriety based only on the first three sources of moral sentiments, without suggesting that those sources were ultimately inferior.


From:
Michael Munger

Here.

​
False pretences of knowledge about complicated economic situations have become all too common in public policy debates. This column argues that policymakers should take into account what they don’t know in their decision making. It describes a tractable approach for acknowledging, characterising, and responding to different forms of uncertainty, by using theories and statistical methods available at any particular moment.


From:

Lars Peter Hansen
Thomas Sargent

Here. 

Experimental work in monetary economics is usually based on theory that incorporates an infinite horizon. Yet, hard constraints on laboratory sessions lead to finite times when the game must (with probability 1) end, and then simple backward induction implies monetary equilibria cannot exist. Hence, these experiments cannot evaluate subjects’ ability to settle on the use of money as a medium of exchange, that ameliorates trading frictions, as an equilibrium outcome. To address this, we present some finite-horizon games where monetary exchange is an equilibrium outcome, and report some experimental results using these games.


From:
Douglas Davis Virginia Commonwealth University
Oleg Korenok Virginia Commonwealth University
Peter Norman University of North Carolina
Bruno Sultanum Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Randall Wright UW Madison, FRB Minneapolis, FRB Chicago, and NBER 

Here.

Interestingly:

1. Course descriptions are parsimonious.
2. Several courses are stacked - that is, they have a graduate version that involves doing extra assignments.

Inspired by the famous Sid Meier "Civilization" and "Alpha Centauri" world building games.

Here.

This paper explains how to use a game built using an excel spreadsheet that plays out key structural changes studied in development economics. The game is inspired by Sid Meier’s simulators, namely Civilisation and Alpha Centauri. It provides a fun way to introduce students to the central themes of a development economics course including industrialisation, demographic transition, sources of growth, trade, institutions, diminishing returns when land is a fixed factor, the resource curse, and the importance of productivity. The foundation of the game is a production function, with the class allocating labour and capital to different industries each turn in order to grow their economy. More advanced concepts like trade and institutions are introduced each turn in the form of exogenous shocks. 

From: 
​Mark Fabian

Here.

This paper provides a guide to macroeconomic applications of the theory of rational bubbles. It shows that rational bubbles can be easily incorporated into standard macroeconomic models, and illustrates how they can be used to account for important macroeconomic phenomena. It also discusses the welfare implications of rational bubbles and the role of policy in managing them. Finally, it provides a detailed review of the literature.

From:

Alberto Martin
Jaume Ventura


​

Here.

Workshops were held at the University of Economics in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam on July 22-24, 2019 and at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand on August 1-3, 2019.
​

Presenters and Topics
Dr. Hampton, Dr. Nam, Dr. Murphy, Dr. DeckDr. Cary Deck, University of Alabama
Auctions, Asset Markets, Contests
Dr. Kyle Hampton, Chapman University
Specialization and Trade, Double Auctions, Games
Dr. Jim Murphy, University of Alaska Anchorage
Public Goods, Common Pool Resources, Externalities 
Dr. Pham Nam, University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam workshop only)
Field Experiments in Public Goods

Here.

The economic concepts of market formation, industrial organization, and the behavioral implications of market structure are difficult for students to conceptualize. In this paper, we establish an interactive entrepreneurship game that can be played in a single class period. This game introduces the concepts of entrepreneurship, markets and equilibrium price formation, and firm profit. In a single class period, students form markets and observe “the invisible hand,” form collusive cartels, and see competitive profit driven to zero. In addition, the game can be easily extended to bring new economic topics into the existing framework over the entire course.

From:
Daniel M. Settlage
Jim R. Wollscheid† 

Here.

Financial network structure is an important determinant of systemic risk. This paper examines how the U.S. interbank network evolved over a long and important period that included two key events: the founding of the Federal Reserve and the Great Depression. Banks established connections to correspondents that joined the Federal Reserve in cities with Fed offices, initially reducing overall network concentration. The network became even more focused on Fed cities during the Depression, as survival rates were higher for banks with more existing connections to Fed cities, and as survivors established new connections to those cities over time.


From:
Matthew S. Jaremski
David C. Wheelock

Here.

The hopeless inadequacy of the Basel-centred regime for financial stability exposed by the crises of 2007-8 and, in Europe, 2011-12 must surely count as one the most abject failures of the modern international liberal order, playing its part in calling into question public allegiance to the broader system of global governance that has prevailed since World War II. Given that, notwithstanding such disappointment, the task of redesigning the international financial system was entrusted mainly to officials meeting in Basel, it behoves insiders (current and former policy makers, including me) to cast a sceptical eye over the new construct. Far from declaring ‘job done’, the need for institutional atonement and legitimacy – plus, it might be added, organisational self-interest – point towards identifying and highlighting sins of omission and commission. Those opening remarks are intended to jolt the reader. They do, however, capture the spirit in which I have approached the title of this session, “The resilience of the financial system,” albeit at the risk of overstating weaknesses given the huge improvements in the regulatory regime since 2007/08. The essay gives that issue two twists. One is to ask whether the system is as resilient as policymakers say it is (which I answer in the negative). The other is to explore what it would mean to operationalize, within a Money-Credit Constitution, recent theoretical discussions of “informationally insensitive” safe assets.


From:
Paul Tucker

Here.

This paper brings together divergent approaches to time inconsistency from macroeconomic policy and behavioural economics. Developing Barro and Gordon’s models of rules, discretion and reputation, behavioural discount functions from behavioural microeconomics are embedded into Barro and Gordon’s game-theoretic analysis of temptation versus enforcement to construct an encompassing model, nesting combinations of time consistent and time inconsistent preferences. The analysis presented in this paper shows that, with hyperbolic/quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the enforceable range of inflation targets is narrowed. This suggests limits to the effectiveness of monetary targets, under certain conditions. The paper concludes with a discussion of monetary policy implications, explored specifically in the light of current macroeconomic policy debates.

From:
​Michelle Baddeley

Here.

More like a micro based trade simulation - better for high school students?

But it is always interesting to consider how the power of games to engage students can be a force for good.

Gen Con this year had 70,000 visitors:

https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2019/08/05/gen-con-drew-record-70-000-visitors-officials-say/1923558001/

This is 60,000 people visiting Indianapolis to see old fashioned table-top gaming, NOT video games. Table-top gaming is still alive and well which is fascinating. People want to interact face to face with other  people.