Here.

In this paper, we review the recent advances in the literature of experimental auctions and provide practical advice and guidelines for researchers. We focus on issues related to randomization to treatment and causal identification of treatment effects, on design issues such as selection between different elicitation formats, multiple auction groups in a single session, and house money effects. We also discuss sample size issues related to recent trends about preregistration and pre-analysis plans. We then present the pros and cons of moving auction studies from the lab to the field and review the recent literature on behavioral factors that have been identified as important for auction outcomes. 


From:

Maurizio Canavari
University of Bologna

Andreas C. Drichoutis
Agricultural University of Athens

Jayson L. Lusk
Purdue University

Rodolfo Nayga
​University of Arkansas

Here.

We study the role of experience in the formation of asset price bubbles. Therefore, we conduct two related experiments. One is a call market experiment in which participants trade assets with each other. The other is a learning-to-forecast experiment in which participants only forecast future prices, while the trade, which is based on these forecasts, is computerized. Each experiment comprises three treatments that vary the amount of information about the fundamental value that participants receive. Each market is repeated three times. In both experiments and in all treatments, we observe sizable bubbles. These bubbles do not disappear with experience. Our findings in the call market experiment stand in contrast to the literature. Our findings in the learning-to-forecast experiment are novel. Interestingly, the shape of the bubbles is different between the two experiments. We observe flat bubbles in the call market experiment and boom-and-bust cycles in the learning-to-forecast experiment.


From:

Anita Kopányi-Peuker
Amsterdam School of Economics

Matthias Weber
University of St. Gallen &  Vilnius University

Here.

​I began teaching full-time in 2014 and immediately realized that my traditional lecture was missing something special. As a graduate student, I often found myself referencing video clips in the classroom and even bringing them up on YouTube for my students.
It was clunky and disorganized at first and I realized that needed to change (and fast). I started clipping pieces off YouTube or DVDs and embedding them in my PowerPoint slides for a more seamless transition between information and videos. I often follow-up most videos with a couple of clicker questions to make sure that my students are understanding the concepts from the videos.
Since 2014, I’ve worked with some amazing co-authors to help make resources more readily available. If you’re a fan of The Big Bang Theory, you’ll probably enjoy Bazinganomics, which was a collaboration with some great co-authors. I’ve also spent time collaborating on sites for Parks and Rec and Modern Family. There are also other great resources if you like Seinfeld, The Office, Shark Tank, or Broadway shows.
On this site, however, you’ll find a nice mix of television, movies, comedy specials, or news clips. This is really where I upload things I see while watching tv in my personal time. If you find anything out there, please don’t hesitate to contact me or visit my personal website.
From:

Jadrian Wooten

Penn State

Here.

Standardized classroom economics experiments provide a treasure trove of evidence about how well results reproduce when nearly-identical methods are used. We use a sample of around 20,000 observations to test reproducibility in bargaining and trading. Ultimatum bargaining exhibits some geographical variation, and shows that equal split offers are accepted more often and more quickly than slightly unequal offers. Double auction results are highly reproducible and are close to equilibrium predictions. Our large sample shows robust, strong correlations between how individual surplus and trading order, and autocorrelation ( 0.5) of successive price changes, consistent with trading dynamics based on limited rationality.

Uses MobLab


From:

Po-Hsuan LinMobLab; National Taiwan University
Alexander L. BrownTexas A&M University - Department of Economics
Taisuke ImaiLudwig Maximilian University of Munich
Joseph Tao-yi WangNational Taiwan University - Department of Economics
Stephanie WangUniversity of Pittsburgh
Colin CamererCalifornia Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Here.

This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics emphasizing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the question under which conditions a complex macro-system of interacting agents may or may not coordinate on the rational equilibrium outcome. A general finding is that under positive expectations feedback (strategic complementarity) –where optimistic (pessimistic) expectations can cause a boom (bust)– coordination failures are quite common. The economy is then rather unstable and persistent aggregate fluctuations arise strongly amplified by coordination on trend-following behavior leading to (almost-)self-fulfilling equilibria. Heterogeneous expectations and heuristics switching models match this observed micro and macro behaviour surprisingly well. We also discuss policy implications of this coordination failure on the perfectly rational aggregate outcome and how policy can help to manage the self-organization process of a complex economic system.


From:

Cars Hommes
European Central Bank

Here.

This paper reviews what cryptocurrencies are, and it frames them within the context of historical monetary experiences and contemporary monetary economics. The paper argues that, as pure fiduciary private money, cryptocurrencies are a bubble without a fundamental value and that they will not provide, in general, optimal amounts of money or deliver price stability. Nevertheless, cryptocurrencies can play a role in improving the current means of payments and in disciplining central banks into providing better government-run fiduciary monies.


From:

Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde
University of Pennsylvania

Here.

From:

Jacabo Magnani
Purdue University

David Munro
Middlebury College

Here.

Includes some macro and finance games

Choose the game you want to run, enter the number of players and that's it: You just have to communicate their logins to your students and have them connect to the site with their phones, tablets or laptops. You can then observe and debrief the game through your interface.

Economics-games.com project is led by Nicolas Gruyer and Nicolas Toublanc.

Nicolas Gruyer specialized in Economics after aeronautical engineering studies at ISAE Sup'Aero. After completing a PhD in Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics, he worked as a professor at ENAC (french Civil Aviation National School) for 10 years. During this period, he taught Microeconomics, Industrial Organization and Business Games at ENAC and Air Transport Economics at TSE, and an important part of his teachings was based on economic experiments and games. Since 2012 he is creating games for teaching economics (projects economics-games.com and lud.io)
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Nicolas Toublanc worked for 11 years in software development on web and industrial projects (Airbus, SNCF, Nespresso, ...). Freelance since 2011, he is responsible for the technical development of projects economics-games.com and lud.io.

Here.

From:

Lawrence R. De Geest
Suffolk University

Here.

A classic experiment paper.

From:

Dave Porter
Vernon Smith

Chapman University

Here.

Financial crises are runs on short-term debt. Whatever its form, short-term debt is an inherent feature of a market economy. A run is an information event in which holders of short-term debt no longer want to lend to banks because they receive information leading them to suspect the value of the backing for the debt, so they run. When runs are system-wide they threaten the solvency of the entire financial system, which then requires either public or private intervention to remedy. Runs, which most likely follow credit booms, are integral parts of movements in the macroeconomy.


From:

Gary Gorton
Yale University

Here.

From:

Derek Bruff