Here.


We explore the celebrated Friedman rule for optimal monetary policy in the context of a laboratory economy based on the Lagos-Wright model. The rule that Friedman proposed can be shown to be optimal in a wide variety of different monetary models, including the Lagos-Wright model. However, we are not aware of any prior empirical evidence evaluating the welfare consequences of the Friedman rule. We explore two implementations of the Friedman rule in the laboratory. The first is based on a deflationary monetary policy where the money supply contracts to offset time discounting. The second implementation pays interest on money removing the private marginal cost from holding money. We explore the welfare consequences of these two theoretically equivalent implementations of the Friedman Rule and compare results with two other policy regimes, a constant money supply regime and another regime advocated by Friedman, where the supply of money grows at a constant k-percent rate. We find that, counter to theory, the Friedman rule is not welfare improving, performing no better than a constant money regime. By one welfare measure, we find that the k-percent money growth rate regime performs best.


From:

John Duffy
​Daniela Puzzello

Here:

​hospitalityinsights.ehl.edu/game-based-learning-online-teaching

Can Game-Based Learning techniques be used to reduce the gap in class dynamics and interaction between distance-learning and regular face-to-face learning?
And are they effective in helping students acquire targeted competences?

From:

Philippe MassetDr Jean-Philippe Weisskopf

Mélanie Bonvin

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2201.en.pdf

​This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics emphasizing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the question under which conditions a complex macro-system of interacting agents may or may not coordinate on the rational equilibrium outcome. A general finding is that under positive expectations feedback (strategic complementarity) –where optimistic (pessimistic) expectations can cause a boom (bust)– coordination failures are quite common. The economy is then rather unstable and persistent aggregate fluctuations arise strongly amplified by coordination on trend-following behavior leading to (almost-)self-fulfilling equilibria. Heterogeneous expectations and heuristics switching models match this observed micro and macro behaviour surprisingly well. We also discuss policy implications of this coordination failure on the perfectly rational aggregate outcome and how policy can help to manage the self-organization process of a complex economic system

From:

Cars Hommes
​

Here.

Elsevier Journal:
Computers & EducationVolume 144, January 2020, 103709

(You will have to get access to the journal.)

HighlightsThe effectiveness of using videos for teaching macroeconomics is analyzed.Short video clips have been created as complementary teaching materials.
​
The inferential analysis shows a positive impact on the average test score.The use of video clips increases the probability of achieving high test scores.


AbstractInformation and communication technologies (ICTs) have been integrated in teaching activities to develop new learning environments. Within ICTs, the use of multimedia, such as instructional videos, has attracted significant academic attention. Nevertheless, the use of these technologies in teaching economics has generally lagged behind other disciplines. This paper adds empirical evidence to show the effectiveness of the use of instructional videos in the field of economics. Firstly, videos illustrating dynamic graphical representations of macroeconomic processes have been developed and used in the class of one student group at the University of Seville (Spain), as complementary teaching materials in the macroeconomics curriculum. Secondly, the effectiveness of these videos has been tested by carrying out an inferential analysis on experimental and control groups. Potentially significant variables such as gender, prior knowledge and ability levels of students have been considered in the analysis. Additionally, probit and multinomial probabilistic regressions have been estimated in order to assess the impact of these materials on the probability of achieving higher test scores. The findings confirm the superiority of using instructional video-clips to achieve higher test scores.

Here.

​32nd Annual Teaching Economics Conference Sponsored by Robert Morris University and W. W. Norton

Friday, February 26 2021

Virtual Format via Google Meet

The oldest teaching economics conference in the nation, the Robert Morris University Teaching Conference addresses the interests of teachers of economics at all levels. Plenary presentations in the past have included Stanley Brue, James Buchanan, David Colander, Susan Feiner, Robert Frank, Denise Hazlett, Campbell R. McConnell, Michael Salemi, Phillip Saunders, Bradley Schiller, John Siegfried, William Walstad, and Michael Watts.

Participant presentations and panels complement the plenary speakers. Proposals for presentations and panels are due January 31, 2021.  Register early for a reduced fee by February 19, 2021.
Confirmed speakers for the conference include:
​ 

• Chad Jones, the STANCO 25 Professor of Economics at Stanford University and author of Macroeconomics
• G. Dirk Mateer from the University of Texas at Austin and the author of the best-selling Principles of Economics
• Dee Mecham, the Downing Family Endowed Chair in Economics at The Bishop's School in LaJolla, California, and a member of the AP reader's leadership team

​

Heinemann, Frank, Prof. Dr. frank.heinemann@tu-berlin.de via univalaska.onmicrosoft.com Tue, Feb 2, 4:14 AM (7 days ago)
to esa-announce@googlegroups.com
Dear all,   
We invite submissions for the 11th International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics to be held online, June 21-23, 2021.
 
The workshop will promote an active exchange and interaction of ideas and work on macroeconomic issues from behavioral, experimental, and/or theoretical approaches. Papers for this three-day workshop will be selected by the organizers from submissions. Keynote speakers are Jasmina Arifovic (Simon Fraser University) and Dirk Krueger (University of Pennsylvania).
 
Please find the call for papers attached and further information on our website:
https://www.upf.edu/web/beslab/conference-program-2021 .
To accommodate different time zones, we extend the workshop to three days and restrict ourselves to the time between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. central European time (= 11 a.m. – 2 p.m. Eastern time (New York) = 8 – 11 a.m. Pacific time)
To submit a paper, please send your submission to exp.macro2021@upf.edu. File should be your Paper or extended abstract in an e-mail with the following subject: EM2021_lastname_firstname. Please also send your consent with video recording (form to be found on the website) and fill the short application form.
The deadline for submissions is February 28, 2021. Authors chosen to present papers will be notified approximately by mid-February, and the deadline for workshop registration is March 30. In addition to the workshop, the organizers invite young researchers and graduate students to the 13th BESLab Experimental Economics Summer School in Macroeconomics  in Macroeconomics also held online from June 20 – July 2, 2021. Summer school participants can also attend the workshop. 
Organizers of the workshop: 
·         Gabriele Camera (Chapman University and University of Bologna)
·         John Duffy (University of California, Irvine)
·         Frank Heinemann (Berlin University of Technology)
·         Rosemarie Nagel (ICREA-UPF and Barcelona GSE)
·         Luba Petersen (Simon Fraser University)
·         Shyam Sunder (Yale University)
To see the full list of speakers and papers from the previous editions of this workshop, please visit https://www.upf.edu/web/beslab/previous-events

​11th International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics Call for Papers The Eleventh International Workshop on Theoretical and Experimental Macroeconomics will be held online June 21-23, 2021. To accommodate different time zones, we extend the workshop to three days and restrict ourselves to the time between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. central European time (= 8 – 11 a.m. Pacific time = 11 a.m. – 2 p.m. New York time) The keynote speakers for the 2021 workshop are Jasmina Arifovic (Simon Fraser University) and Dirk Krueger (University of Pennsylvania). The goal of this workshop is to promote an active exchange and interaction of ideas and work on macroeconomic issues using behavioral, experimental, and/or theoretical approaches, and therefore we seek a good mix of theory and experimental papers. The workshop is jointly organized by Technische Universität Berlin and by the BES Lab (Behavioral and Experimental Sciences Lab, (formerly LEEX) at Universitat Pompeu Fabra). For more information, please visit our website https://www.upf.edu/web/beslab/conference‐program‐2021 .  Researchers working on behavioral, experimental and theoretical approaches to addressing macroeconomic questions are invited to submit a paper for this three-day conference. The deadline for submissions is February 28, 2021. Submissions should include either a full paper or an extended abstract including the main results. To submit a paper, please send to exp.macro2021@upf.edu two attached files: One file should be your Paper or extended abstract. Please note that the Workshop sessions will be video recorded. Paper submissions should include a signed consent form for video recording (second attached file, form to be found on the website under applications). Please send both in an e-mail with the following subject: EM2021_lastname_firstname. Please also fill the short application form. Please note that the Workshop sessions will be video recorded. Paper submissions should include a signed consent form for video recording. Authors chosen to present papers will be notified in March, and the deadline for workshop registration is April 30. In addition to the workshop, the organizers invite young researchers and graduate students to the 13th BESLab Experimental Economics Summer School in Macroeconomics also held online from June 20 – July 2, 2021. Summer school participants can also attend the workshop. Information about previous workshops is available here. Please forward this announcement to all interested parties. Workshop Organizers  Gabriele Camera (Chapman University and University of Bologna)  John Duffy (University of California, Irvine)  Frank Heinemann (Technische Universität Berlin)  Rosemarie Nagel (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona GSE )  Luba Petersen (Simon Fraser University)  Shyam Sunder (Yale University) 

Here.

Short-term debt is commonly used to fund illiquid assets. A conventional view asserts that such arrangements are run-prone in part because redemptions must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. This sequential service protocol, however, appears absent in the wholesale banking sector—and yet, shadow banks appear vulnerable to runs. We explain how banking arrangements that fund fixed-cost operations using short-term debt can be run-prone even in the absence of sequential service. Interventions designed to eliminate run risk may or may not improve depositor welfare. We describe how optimal policies vary under different conditions and compare these to recent policy interventions by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve. We conclude that the conventional view concerning the societal benefits of liquidity transformation and its recommendations for prudential policy extend far beyond their application to depository institutions.  

From:

David Andolfatto
​Ed Nosal

​

Experimental Finance Conference 2021, Innsbruck, June 16-18
The Department of Banking and Finance at the University of Innsbruck and the Society for Experimental Finance (SEF) invite you to the Experimental Finance Conference 2021, to be held in Innsbruck (Austria) from June 16-18, 2021. The conference also serves as the 11th annual meeting of the SEF.
The prevailing Covid-19 situation in June requires flexibility: The conference will take place in any case – if possible as an in-person event, otherwise as an online event or as a combination thereof. If you cannot attend the conference in person but your paper is accepted, you will have the possibility to give your presentation online. You can find regular updates on organizational details at our conference website: https://www.ef-2021.com. 


Keynote speakers:

• Annamaria Lusardi (George Washington University School of Business)
• Stefan Nagel (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

Talks with a View (Anniversary Special):

• Roberto Weber (University of Zürich)
• Michael Kirchler (University of Innsbruck)

Submission
We invite you to submit full papers or extended abstracts (with a minimum of 1000 words) using experimental methods covering all areas of finance, broadly defined (please only submit if you have already collected data). Submissions will be peer-reviewed by two anonymous referees. Presentations will be given either in plenary sessions or parallel sessions.
For more information and for submitting your work, please refer to our conference website at: https://www.ef-2021.com


Vernon L. Smith Young Talent Award in Experimental Finance
If you are a junior scientist, we also invite you to apply for the Vernon L. Smith Young Talent Award in Experimental Finance for the best conference paper. This prize is awarded by the SEF and Chapman University and amounts to 8000 USD. See https://www.ef-2021.com/young-talent-award/ for details on the application.


Important Dates
February 28: Submission deadline
March 31: Notification of acceptance


Organizers
Jürgen Huber (University of Innsbruck)
Zwetelina Iliewa (Max Planck Institute, Bonn and SEF Officer)
Christian König-Kersting (University of Innsbruck)
Matthias Stefan (University of Innsbruck and SEF Officer)
​

Here.


We provide an overview of the relationship between financial networks and systemic risk. We present a taxonomy of different types of systemic risk, differentiating between direct externalities between financial organizations (e.g., defaults, correlated portfolios and firesales), and perceptions and feedback effects (e.g., bank runs, credit freezes). We also discuss optimal regulation and bailouts, measurements of systemic risk and financial centrality, choices by banks’ regarding their portfolios and partnerships, and the changing nature of financial networks. JEL Classification Codes: D85, F15, F34, F36, F65, G15, G32, G33, G38 Keywords: Financial Networks, Markets, Systemic Risk, Financial Crises, Correlated Portfolios, Networks, Banks, Default Risk, Credit Freeze, Bank Runs, Shadow Banking, Supply Chains, Compression, Financial Bubbles 

From:

Matthew O. Jackson and Agathe Pernoud

Here.

We provide an overview of the relationship between financial networks and systemic risk. We present a taxonomy of different types of systemic risk, differentiating between direct externalities between financial organizations (e.g., defaults, correlated portfolios and firesales), and perceptions and feedback effects (e.g., bank runs, credit freezes). We also discuss optimal regulation and bailouts, measurements of systemic risk and financial centrality, choices by banks’ regarding their portfolios and partnerships, and the changing nature of financial networks. JEL Classification Codes: D85, F15, F34, F36, F65, G15, G32, G33, G38 Keywords: Financial Networks, Markets, Systemic Risk, Financial Crises, Correlated Portfolios, Networks, Banks, Default Risk, Credit Freeze, Bank Runs, Shadow Banking, Supply Chains, Compression, Financial Bubbles 


From:

Matthew O. Jackson and Agathe Pernoud
​

Here.

The leadership structure of the American Economics Association is documented using a biographical database covering every officer and losing candidate for AEA offices from 1950 to 2019. The analysis focuses on institutional affiliations by education and employment. The structure is strongly hierarchical. A few institutions dominate the leadership, and their dominance has become markedly stronger over time. Broadly two types of explanations are explored: that institutional dominance is based on academic merit or that it based on self-perpetuating privilege. Network effects that might explain the dynamic of increasing concentration are also investigated.

From:

Kevin D. Hoover and Andrej Svorenčík

Here.

This paper is the first to use the WeChat platform, one of the largest social networks, to conduct an online experiment of artificial investment games. We investigate how people’s forecasts about the financial market and investment decisions are shaped by whether they can observe others’ forecasts and whether they engage in public or private investment decisions. We find that with forecast sharing, subjects’ forecasts converge but in different directions across groups; consequently, forecast sharing does not lead to better forecasts nor more individually rational investment decisions. Whether or not subjects engage in public investment decisions does not significantly affect forecasts or investment. 
​

From:

Xiu Chen
Fuhai Hong
​Xiaojian Zhao

Here.

Recent years have seen an emergence of decentralized cryptocurrencies that were initially devised as a payment system, but are increasingly being recognized as investment instruments. The price trajectories of cryptocurrencies have raised questions among economists and policymakers, especially since such markets can have spillover effects on the real economy. We focus on two key properties of cryptocurrencies that may contribute to their pricing. In a controlled lab setting, we test whether pricing is influenced by costly mining, as well as entry barriers to the mining technology. Our mining design resembles the proof-of-work mechanism employed by the vast majority of permissionless cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. In our second condition, half of the traders have access to the mining technology, while the other half can only participate in the market. This is designed to model high concentration in cryptocurrency mining. In the absence of mining, no bubbles or crashes occur. When costly mining is introduced, assets are traded at prices more than 200% higher than fundamental value and the bubble peaks relatively late in the trading periods. When only half of the traders can mine, prices surge much earlier and reach values of almost 400% higher than the fundamental value at the peak of the market. Overall, the proof-of-work mechanism seems to fuel overpricing, which is further intensified by concentration in mining.

​From:

Marco Lambrecht
Andis Sofianos
Yilong Xu

To be clear, this is a simulation, not a lab experiment, but interesting.

Here.

The transfer paradox, whereby a transfer of resources that influences the equilibrium price benefits the donor while harming the recipient, is a classic paradox in general equilibrium theory. This paper pursues an experimental investigation of the transfer paradox using a theoretical framework of a three-agent pure exchange economy that is predicted to have such a paradox. Two treatments were conducted. In the first treatment, there was one subject for each agent role in the experimental economy. In the other treatment, there were five subjects for each agent role (a total of 15 subjects) in the experimental economy. The experiment results indicate that a transfer of endowments among agents influenced the market clearing price, and consequently the donors benefited from this transfer, consistent with the competitive equilibrium theory. The equilibrium effects were strongest in the treatment with larger group size, resonating with the idea that having a larger number of market participants encourages them to behave competitively. Further, when given an option to make a transfer, the majority of the donor agents endogenously decide to adjust the endowment distribution. A detailed analysis found that the subjects’ decisions to transfer were mainly driven by the equilibrium effects on prices, and their decisions were largely unaffected by their measured level of cognitive ability.


From:

Kenju Kamei